![]() ![]() This blog post enumerates and documents these gaps, describes workarounds for serious shortcomings, and provides suggestions for future work. Even in cases where proper security and privacy features exist, they typically require extensive configuration to use safely, securely, and correctly. However, all of these projects have shortcomings and often leave gaps in what they provide and protect. Organizations like Cyanogen, F-Droid, the Guardian Project, and many others have done a great deal of work to try to improve this situation by restoring control of Android devices to the user, and to ensure the integrity of our personal communications. This post aims to address this, but we must first admit we stand on the shoulders of giants. Worse still, by default, the user is given very little in the way of control or even informed consent about what information is being collected and how. This includes the full content of personal communications with business partners and loved ones. In fact, they've seemingly been designed with nearly the opposite goal: to make it easy for third parties, telecommunications companies, sophisticated state-sized adversaries, and even random hackers to extract all manner of personal information from the user. Unfortunately though, mobile devices in general and Android devices in particular have not been designed with privacy in mind. Moreover, the core of the Android platform is Open Source, auditable, and modifiable by anyone. However, as an added bonus, we will describe how to handle the Google Play store as well, to mitigate the two infamous Google Play Backdoors.Īndroid is the most popular mobile platform in the world, with a wide variety of applications, including many applications that aid in communications security, censorship circumvention, and activist organization. The SIP client we recommend also supports dialing normal telephone numbers if you have a SIP gateway that provides trunking service.Īside from a handful of binary blobs to manage the device firmware and graphics acceleration, the entire system can be assembled (and recompiled) using only FOSS components. ZRTP does run over UDP which is not yet possible to send over Tor, but we are able to send SIP account login and call setup over Tor independently. This blog post describes the installation and configuration of a prototype of a secure, full-featured, Android telecommunications device with full Tor support, individual application firewalling, true cell network baseband isolation, and optional ZRTP encrypted voice and video support. The future is here, and ahead of schedule. This post has been updated further by the November 2016 Refresh of the same idea Executive Summary Updates: See the Changes section for a list of changes since initial posting. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |